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Reply to Voltolini 
 
 
When a story-teller tells a story he pretends to report facts (Lewis 1978). But those 
facts are not really facts ; they are fiction. In particular, when the characters that are 
mentioned as part of the fiction do not really exist, the story-teller does not really refer 
to them — he merely pretends to do so. 
Fictional names are empty names, because they ‗refer‘ only fictively. It follows 
that the fictional sentences issued by the story-teller, insofar as they involve such 
names, do not really express singular propositions, but merely pretend to do so. 
What about metafictional sentences, such as ‗In Les Misérables, Jean Valjean 
worries about Cosette‘ ? The names ‗Jean Valjean‘ and ‗Cosette‘ are both fictional 
names — they refer only fictively. Neither Jean Valjean nor Cosette exist. Does it not 
follow that the metafictional sentences themselves lack content and fail to express 
the singular propositions they pretend to express ? I think that consequence follows, 
unless one accepts to drop at least one of the following principles: 
 
• Names (including fictional names) are directly referential expressions. 
• A sentence such as ‗Jean Valjean worries about Cosette‘ (and each of its 
constituents) keeps the same meaning in all of its occurrences ; in particular, the 
sentence has the same meaning whether it occurs in isolation or as a constituent in a 
more complex sentence. 
• There is no context-shifting operator in English. 
 
The problem is that there is a strong intuitive difference between a fictional 
sentence as it occurs in, say, Les Misérables (‗Jean Valjean worries about Cosette‘) 
and the corresponding metafictional sentence (‗In Les Misérables, Jean Valjean 
worries about Cosette‘). The former arguably lacks content and only pretends to 
express a singular proposition, hence it is not truth-evaluable ; but the latter seems to 
say something true or false about the fiction. This suggests that there is something 
wrong with at least one of the two principles liste above.  
The principles are not sacrosanct, but we may be reluctant to give up either of 
them. Assuming that is so,  what can we do ? In ‗Talk about fiction‘ and Oratio 
Obliqua, Oratio Recta, I sketched a possible solution, which Alberto Voltolini 
criticizes. According to that solution, metafictional sentences also rest on pretense. 
They are not literally truth-evaluable. Like fictional sentences, they fail to express a 
definite content whenever the names they contain are empty. The intuitive difference 
with fictional sentences is due to the fact that, in the metafictional case, the pretense 
at stake is of the ‗shallow‘ type (Crimmins 1998) : it is unavailable to consciousness 
because it is built into our ordinary ways of speaking and thinking. This is similar to 
certains sorts of metaphor that are not perceptible because they permeate our 
ordinary talk. Thus we say that the mountain range ‗goes from Mexico to Los 
Angeles‘, without even realizing that we use a motion verb to describe a static 
relation (Talmy 1996).  
The pretense at work in metafictional sentences I call the Meinongian 
pretense. It consists in treating existence as a property which some things (the ‗real‘ 
objects) have and others don‘t. We do as if there were two sorts of objects in the 
world: the real objects, which exist, and another sort of object —fictional objects, 
intentional objects, etc. — that are ghostlike in that they lack the property of real 
existence but have other properties nonetheless. Thus a fictional character such as 
Jean Valjean does not really exist, but that does not prevent us from referring and 
ascribing properties to him, as in metafictional talk. Were it not for the Meinongian 
pretense, we could not do that. Jean Valjean‘s nonexistence would block any 
reference to him.  
By relying on the Meinongian pretense and saying something that is not 
literally truth-evaluable (because the names do not really refer), we manage to 
communicate something that is true or false. Thus by fictively referring to Jean 
Valjean and Cosette and saying that, in the story, the former worries about the latter, 
we ascribe to the story properties which it really has : the property of featuring two 
individuals x and y with a certain number of properties (including the property of 
being called respectively ‗Jean Valjean‘ and ‗Cosette‘), such that x worries about y. 
Similarly, when I say that my four-year old child believes that Santa Claus will come 
tonight, I rely on the Meinongian pretense to ascribe to a nonexistent individual 
(Santa Claus) the property that my child believes he will come tonight ; and by thus 
fictively ascribing to my child a singular belief, I manage to  convey something true 
about the state of mind he is in. As I put it in OOOR, ‗the fictive ascription of a 
singular belief… amounts to the factive ascription of a pseudo-singular belief‘ 
(Recanati 2000 : 226). (The fictive/factive terminology, as well as the ‗mountain 
range‘ example of fictive motion, comes from Talmy 1996.) 
Voltolini thinks this account goes too far, or not far enough, depending upon 
the cases. In some cases, he argues, there is indeed pretense, but there is nothing 
more. He gives the following example : 
 
Suppose I mishear a sentence saying that war is terrible, by taking ―war‖ as a 
proper name of someone. Requested of writing what I heard, I scribble: ―War 
is terrible‖ (note the majuscule), using ―War‖ as proper name and 
misconceiving it as referring to someone I do not know. (…) If someone said of 
me: ―A.V. believes that War is terrible‖ this sentence would not have real truth-
conditions, hence a real truth-value, but merely fictive truth-conditions, hence 
a fictive truth-value. 
 
Voltolini denies that, in such a case, the sentence ‗A.V. believes that War is 
terrible‘ acquires factive truth-conditions on top of its fictive truth-conditions. In the 
described circumstances, the ascribee does not believe anything, Voltolini holds, 
even if he takes himself to believe something. The ascribee takes himself to believe a 
singular proposition involving the individual named ‗War‘, but there is no such 
individual, hence there is no singular proposition either. It follows that no (first-level) 
belief can be seriously (i.e. nonfictively) ascribed to the subject in such 
circumstances. 
I think this criciticism misses its target. When I say that, in such circumstances, 
the fictive ascription of a singular belief amounts to the factive ascription of a pseudo-
singular belief, I explicitly acknowledge the fact that no genuine singular belief can be 
ascribed to the subject. By ‗pseudo-singular belief‘ I mean a state of mind that is 
precisely not a genuine belief, because it lacks a definite content. By overtly 
pretending that there is an individual, named ‗War‘, of whom A.V. believes that he is 
terrible, the speaker manages to communicate that A.V. takes war as a proper name 
of someone and (spuriously) ‗believes‘ of that person that ‗he‘ is terrible. All this, 
which is true and could be spelt out in a more technical vocabulary (without scare 
quotes), is conveyed through the pretense. This is what I mean when I say that the 
fictive ascription of a singular belief amounts to the factive ascription of a pseudo-
singular belief. 
Voltolini grants that, in some cases, we definitely want to ascribe beliefs to the 
subject even though the names at stake do not refer to flesh-and-blood individuals. 
Thus we really want to ascribe to my son a belief to the effect that Santa Claus will 
come tonight, even though Santa Claus does not exist. In such cases a ‗factive‘ 
ascription is made, which can be evaluated as true or false. Whenever that is so, 
Voltolini points out, this shows that « the name is not empty after all ». It does not 
refer to a flesh-and-blood individual, but it refers to something nonetheless : a 
fictional individual or ‗character‘ in the Jean Valjean example, or an ‗intentional object‘ 
in the Santa Claus example. No ‗Meinongian pretense‘ needs to be appealed to to 
account for such cases: we do not have to ‗pretend‘ that fictional and intentional 
objects are part of our ontology, because they are part of our ontology. That is 
Voltolini‘s line. 
I confess that I have some sympathy for this view, at least if the ‗ontology‘ 
we‘re talking about is the actual ontology that underlies our ordinary way of speaking 
and thinking. As Godehart Link wrote in a very influential paper, « our guide in 
ontological matters has to be language itself » (Link 1998 : 13). That is why Link 
decided to posit ‗plural objects‘ in the ontology alongside ordinary objects. Thus the 
coins on this table are (formal semanticists tell us) an object distinct from the 
individual coins which are its parts even though they are ‗materially‘ identical. If we 
are prepared to say that, we should  also be prepared to say that Superman and 
Clark Kent are two distinct objects even though, in some sense, they are the same 
individual. According to Crimmins (1998), we ‗do as if‘ Superman and Clark Kent 
were two distinct objects : a pretense is involved. But if the pretense is so ‗shallow‘ 
and natural that we are not even conscious of it, why not simply decide to enrich the 
formal ontology with the relevant sort of objects ? Why not accept guises and 
personalities and fictional objects alongside ordinary individuals ? 
In the case of fictional objects, we can‘t do without pretense, for fictional 
objects exist only through the pretense which is constitutive of story-telling. In story-
telling, we pretend to be referring to flesh-and-blood individuals. Yet, it can be 
maintained, this very activity creates fictional characters to which we can factively 
refer. In this regard there is a useful convention : whenever a fictional character has 
come into existence through the fictive use of a name NN in story-telling, it is possible 
to use the same name NN factively to refer to that fictional character. Fictional names 
therefore turn out to have a dual use : in the pretense-internal use they fictively refer 
to flesh-and-blood individuals that do not really exist ; but in the pretense-external 
use they factively refer to fictional individuals which do exist (as entities distinct from 
flesh-and-blood individual). This means that we give up the second of the three 
principles mentioned above : the name ‗Jean Valjean‘ does not behave in the same 
way in the fiction (where it is empty and only pretends to refer) and outside the fiction 
(where it is not empty, but refers to a character). This I take to be Voltolini‘s position, 
and, again, I have sympathy for it. After all, many words have distinct, though related, 
uses. For example, the word ‗wish‘ has a psychological sense (meaning desire). That 
sense is at work in the  optative use of the verb in sentences such as ‗I wish that you 
will soon recover‘. Now that optative use gave rise, through ‗delocutive derivation‘, to 
a new sense for ‗wish‘ : the sense express wishes, as in ‗He wished me good luck‘.1 
Something similar to delocutive derivation may account for the transition from the 
fictive to the factive use of fictional names. 
                                            
1 See my Meaning and Force, chapter 4, and the references cited therein. 
Between the two theories – the pretense-based theory, and the true 
Meinongian theory – the difference is not as big as one might have thought. I am not 
even sure that they are not notational variants, for two reasons. First, the fictional 
objects which the Meinongian posits as part of our ontology supervene upon our 
simulative practices targeted toward ordinary objects. This gives them a derived 
status which deprives them of first-class citizenship in our ontology. Second, even the 
pretense-based theory as stated in OOOR acknowledges something like a dual use 
for fictional names ; for the metafictional use of fictional names rests on a different 
sort of pretense (the Meinongian pretense) than that which underlies their fictional 
use. 
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